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John Stopford 
In this paper I discuss the relationship between reason, morality, and 
skill in a well-ordered liberal democracy.2 I argue that while skill played 
an important role in the ethical life of the ancient world, the 
marginalization of skill and craftsmanship has blinded us to the 
importance of a public culture of skill in the modern world. This applies, 
in particular, to the public role of skill as one of the “cultural conditions 
of autonomy” (and a fortiori of political autonomy) in a liberal political 
regime (Stopford 2009, 39-45). Not only do citizens need certain basic 
kinds of skill to express their autonomy. Such skills may also contribute 
to the capacity for “flourishing within limits” that some ecological 
economists regard as a key factor in the development of sustainable 
human societies.3 
Skillful work shaped the cultural life of the archaic Greek world. The 
craft worker was an established figure in the community, honored for 
their contributions to a commodious life. The public craftsman or 
demioergos (δημιουργός - Homer’s word) was “a bringer of civilization,”
distinguished by competence and know-how, the member of a 
community of skilled producers whose focus was on quality and doing 
good work (Sennett 2008, 25). Craft workers acquired their know-how in 
1 An early version of this paper was read at the workshop on “Moral realism and political 
decisions: a new framework of practical rationality for contemporary multicultural Europe" 
organized by members of the Universities of Bamberg and Trieste in Bamberg, Germany, 
on 19 - 22 December 2013. I would like to thank the organizers, Professor Gabriele De 
Anna of the University of Bamberg, and Professor Riccardo Martinelli of the University of 
Trieste, for the opportunity to participate in the workshop. The methodological framework 
of my discussion is “political not metaphysical” in the sense of Rawls (1985; 1996, 10). For 
this reason I focus mainly on questions of practical rationality, leaving all but the most 
important metaphysical and epistemological issues to one side. 
2 I use “well-ordered” in the sense of Rawls (1971, 4-5) to refer to a society that is effectively 
regulated by a public conception of justice. 
3 See Jackson (2009), Chapter 9.  
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long and painstaking apprenticeships, developing and modifying their 
skills throughout their lives (25-26). 
The work of the demioergos was more than a job. Someone who does 
a job does not produce a work. But what was the work of the public 
producer in Greece? Philosophical phrases such as ‘form-giving activity,’ 
which we associate with the production of works, are not informative if 
we are interested in understanding how a work comes into existence (in 
German: wie es entsteht). How can we study form-giving activity? 
Producing things involves a number of related but distinct skills that 
even the producer may not always be aware of using. Sculpting, 
molding, weaving, embossing, and whittling engage maker and material 
in ways that are often inscrutable. 
Skillful activity tends to be “transparent” (durchsichtig) in the sense of 
Heidegger (Heidegger 1927, 146; 1962, 187). The more competent we 
become in exercising a skill, the less we may notice ourselves as we 
exercise it. Skill may be all but invisible to an onlooker. Everyday 
language lacks words to describe the subtleties of skillful activity. The 
Latinized expressions ‘form,’ ‘creation,’ or ‘product’ shed little light on 
the engaged material consciousness of the demioergos. Evocative 
expressions such as the necessary poetry of things (MacGregor 2010) 
work at the level of metaphor but may miss something that is important 
about crafting with one’s hands.  
Although the public status of the demioergoi was in decline by the 4th 
century BCE, craftsmanship and skill still exercised a decisive influence 
on the philosophers of classical Greece: “[t]he craftsman lets kosmos 
appear through the artifact” (McEwen 1993, 73). Plato's hierarchy of 
Reality pairs the various levels of being with different kinds and qualities 
of craftsmanship. “That which truly is” is the work of the World 
Craftsman (demioergos) of the Timaeus who endows the world with 
motion, order and beauty in order that it should thus participate in His 
goodness (Lavecchia 2012, 13). Plato, his criticisms of the poets 
notwithstanding, characterizes the true craftsman as someone who 
seeks the perfection of that which he creates.  
In the early dialogues Plato often identifies craft with knowledge 
(Parry 1996, 15). In the Republic, it can be argued (though it is not a 
matter of consensus) that Plato holds justice in its most developed form 
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to be a craft (101), perhaps a “second-order craft” or “supercraft”.4 
Surveying antiquity from a post-Cartesian perspective we sometimes 
suppose that representations and what they represent belong to discrete 
ontological orders. But for Plato, craftsmanship is the source of a 
seamless continuity between intellectual objects and the visible cosmos.  
Aristotle's distinction between technê as poïesis (ποίησις) and praxis 
(πρᾶξις) seems to preclude the identification of virtue with craftsman-
ship. Craftsmanship involves the production of things --- bringing some-
thing forth --- rather than acting, far less acting rightly. And virtue pro-
duces not things but actions. In the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle argues 
that virtue is not a craft. Scholars have inferred from this that it is a mis-
take to focus on the role of craft in Aristotle’s ethical theory.5 This does 
not imply that Aristotle’s view of ethics and practical reasoning is not 
influenced by a craft model, however (Angier 2010, 36), or that his views 
on craft are without significance for ethical and political theory. This 
holds, in particular, of any approach that is not committed to a rigid di-
chotomization of production and action. Thus Murphy asks if it is “really 
plausible that there is no moral dimension to production or that there 
are no techniques of action?” (Murphy 1993, 92).  
A craft and its products may be used for morally good or bad ends, 
and such ends are normally considered to be external to the craft. We do 
not charge a knife with a crime just because it is sharp. Skill and crafts-
manship may be ethically significant in other ways, however. Murphy 
cites Rawls’s Aristotelian Principle (Rawls 1971, 426) to illustrate the im-
portance of skill to human flourishing (εὐδαιμονία): “we are willing to 
undergo the stress of practice and learning [… because …] we anticipate 
the rewards of mastering complex new skills” (Murphy 1993, 6). The 
                                                 
4 Plato uses both demioergos and various cognate forms of technê (variously translated as 
‘craft,’ ‘skill,’ ‘expertise’ or ‘know-how’) in the Republic and elsewhere. On the translation of 
technê and the relation between technê and epistêmê see Parry (2014). Here I follow Parry 
(1996) in rejecting the view that craft is only instrumental in the Republic, and hence that vir-
tue, which is desired for itself and not merely instrumentally, cannot be a craft. Angier, while 
concluding that Plato fails to develop the case for a “genuine virtue-techne,” thinks that Aristo-
tle’s ethical views are nevertheless influenced by the craft model (Angier 2010, 1, 32). 
5 For a comprehensive discussion of the relation between craft (technê) and virtue (aretê) in 
the Nicomachean Ethics, see Parry 2014.  
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ability to exercise skills, and in particular complex skills, is an important 
feature of a good life, even if attaining and maintaining them requires 
considerable effort. 
At another level, skill might be said to play a structural role in the 
ability to produce things autonomously. In this respect, a morally auton-
omous person can be compared to the skilled craft worker who both 
conceives and executes a plan. In such cases we can speak of the unity of 
conception and production (νόησις and ποίησις) (Aristotle, Metaphysics 
1032b15; Murphy, 8). The dignity of skilled work depends on the ability 
of the worker to execute a plan they have themselves conceived (8). The 
unskilled worker, by contrast, merely executes a plan that has been con-
ceived by someone else.  
Once immersed in the productive dialectic of conception and execu-
tion, the skilled worker draws on the principles of their craft to solve 
problems of execution while reciprocally deepening their grasp of those 
principles on the basis of their experiences with a particular material (8). 
Producing things according to a plan that is one’s own not only leads to 
the development of more complex skills (8). When they work according 
to their own plan people learn to produce autonomously. “Through this 
dialectic of conception and execution we become autonomous subjects, 
rather than mere instruments, of labour” (8).  
Perhaps we can draw on this image of the craft worker to model the 
role of cultural skills in liberal democracy (Stopford 2009, 39-45). The 
cultural conditions of autonomy are the practices, traditions and ways of 
doing things that constitute a cultural context within which autonomous 
choice is possible. Such practices and traditions are not simply given: 
they have a history, vary from culture to culture, and must be learned. 
The subjective cultural conditions of autonomy are the competences and 
skills that are implicit in an understanding of its objective conditions 
(40-41). When we act autonomously and make choices about how to live 
we do not reflect theoretically on the practices and traditions that form 
the cultural context of our choices: we simply engage that context skill-
fully, making use of the tools and materials that our culture provides. 
One of the consequences of the marginalization of skill is that public 
recognition of skill is reduced as the functions of conception and execu-
tion are distributed between different individuals and classes. Aristotle 
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writes at a time when the publicly recognized skill of the demioergos was 
beginning to be marginalized, and the “hand” separated from the “head” 
(Sennett 2008, 23; Stopford 2011, 29). Aristotle sometimes replaces the 
traditional word for a craft worker, demioergos, with cheirotechnon 
(χειροτεχνῶν) – ‘handworker’ – arguing in the Metaphysics that “the ar-
chitects (architektonikon) in every profession are more estimable and 
know more and are wiser than the artisans because they know the rea-
sons of the things which are done” (Metaphysics, 981a30-b2; Sennett 
23).6 Such linguistic shifts not only confirm the division of intellectual 
and manual labour, but also the diminished public standing of the arti-
san: 
 
[…] while the work of the artisan was admired, he was neglected or 
down-graded as a person […]. And what is more important, there 
never was, except in the constructions of some theorists, like the 
town-planner and philosopher Hippodamus of Miletus, any such 
thing as a category of artisans (Vidal-Naquet 1977, 12). 
 
By the early 20th Century, proponents of scientific management 
recommended shifting all planning activities from workers to 
management (Taylor 1917, 38; Murphy, 8). For Taylor it is “clear that in 
most cases one type of man is needed to plan ahead and an entirely 
different type to execute the work” (Taylor, 38). Taylor may have believed 
that there are inherent differences between people that make some more 
suited for conceptual work than others, a view that Adam Smith might 
well have rejected. Smith acknowledges in The Wealth of Nations that the 
repetitive performance of a small number of simple tasks rather than 
innate deficiency is to blame for the mental and moral torpor of the 
“labouring poor,” arguing that government should provide education to 
counteract these effects.7  
Here, as in his Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith accepts the human 
costs of the division of labour and commercial society as the price of 
                                                 
6 As quoted by Sennett 2008, 23.  ἀρχιτέκτονας is translated by Tredennick (1933, 7)  as 
“master craftsmen” rather than “architects”. 
7 See Smith (1909), Book 5, especially Article II, “Of the Expense of the Institution for the 
Education of Youth” (485ff). 
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economic growth and opulence, at least in its early stages. More recently, 
Rainer Marten has argued that the capacity for sympathetic 
identification married to the moral perspective of the “impartial 
spectator,” to which Smith appeals, is an unequal match for the 
disfiguring extremes of Schumpeterian capitalism.8 Disruptive 
entrepreneurism cannot be tamed by feelings of sympathy. When such 
feelings do perform a moral function it can only be from within a social 
scheme that has already been humanized in other ways (Marten 2009, 
69).9 
To understand the characteristics of such a scheme it is necessary to 
look deeper into our ideas about the relationship between skill and 
wealth. Both Xenophon and Aristotle view the wealth acquired and used 
by households as an instrument or tool (Booth 1993, 41).10 In The 
Economist, Xenophon’s Socrates refers to wealth as an “instrument” 
(ὄργανα χρήματα) that he has never possessed (Xenophon 1971, 13).11 In 
                                                 
8 See e.g. Schumpeter 1994,  83:  “This process of Creative Destruction is the essential fact 
about capitalism. It is what capitalism consists in and what every capitalist concern has got 
to live in.” 
9 But see Schumpeter 1954.  The question of the “coherence” of Smith’s economic and 
moral theories is too complex to present in the space available here. For a recent informa-
tive discussion of these issues, see the introduction to Haakonssen 2006.  
10 The fact that Aristotle sometimes treats money as conventional, and sometimes as a 
commodity like other commodities does not seem to detract from his underlying view that 
true wealth is “the knowledge how to use things rightly.” See Barker 1959, 380-381.  
11 On this interpretation of organa chremata see Booth (1993, 41). Booth notes that chrema-
ta is related to chreia suggesting “need” rather than demand, and cites Aristotle, Ni-
comachean Ethics 1097a28 and Politics1253b31-32 in support of this reading. Aristotle dis-
tinguishes oikonomia from chrematistics. Oikonomia, in the words of Daly and Cobb (1994, 
138-139) deals with “the management of the household so as to increase its use value to all 
members of the household over the long run;” chrematistics concerns the “manipulation 
of property and wealth so as to maximize short-term monetary exchange value to the own-
er.” See also Anielski (2007, 23). Aristotle distinguishes at least two kinds of chrematistics, 
one of which uses money as a means of exchange for the sake of the goals of the house-
hold, while the other makes the acquisition of money an end in itself: “[t]hat is why it ap-
pears on the one hand that all wealth must have a limit and yet why on the other hand we 
see the opposite happening in fact. For all those engaged in business increase money 
without limit. The reason is the closeness between them. For the two uses of business, 
being of the same thing, overlap, since property has the same use in both cases but not in 
the same respect: while of the one use, something else is the end; of the other, the end is 
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the same passage he compares the art of using wealth to that of 
performing on a musical instrument. To own a flute is to be able to play 
it. Without being able to play it one cannot own it. There is also a second 
sense in which one may use a flute without being able to play it, for the 
purpose of exchange. “So it is clear to us that a flute in the hands of a 
man who does not know how to use it, is not property to him, unless he 
sell it” (4). Wealth, we might likewise say, is useful in its primary sense 
when we know how to “play” it. 
While this may seem to involve a “high redefinition” of ‘wealth,’ it is 
a view that flows directly into Aristotle’s autarkic theory of the household 
(Booth, 41). The needs of the household for wealth are intrinsically self-
limiting since “[n]o tool of any art is without limit in either quantity or 
size, and wealth is a multitude of tools for the arts of ruling household 
and city” (Aristotle 1997, 1256b26).12 The soul has its proper objects, 
with which recognizable limits are associated. Food, for example, is the 
proper object of the nutritive soul. Its acquisition and use are governed 
by ethical requirements involving balance, proportion and the avoidance 
of excess (Stopford 2011, 30). The modern “food system,” by contrast, 
decontextualizes food: as a vehicle for the delivery of nutrients to the 
body, on the one hand, and as a commodity with an exchange value on 
the other.13 Here there is no room for skillful activity. The activities of 
                                                                                                       
increase. As a result, it seems to some that increase is the work of the science of household 
management, and they end up thinking they must either preserve or increase their sub-
stance of money without limit.” People confuse the two kinds of business “because they 
are more serious about life than about good life (…). And if they cannot get what they want 
through business itself, they pervert everything else into business instead.” (Aristotle, 1997 
1257b-1258a). 
12 See Aristotle (1997, 1256b26): “So, one kind of the science of property is naturally part of 
the science of household management, and this property must either be present or the 
science must provide it so that it is present. It consists in a store of things necessary for life 
and useful to the community of city or household. And true wealth at any rate would seem 
to be made up of these things. For self-sufficiency in this sort of property with a view to 
good life is not unlimited, contrary to what Solon says in the line: ‘to wealth no limit has 
been laid down for human beings.’ For such a limit has been laid down, just as it has in 
the case of the other arts. No tool of any art is without limit in either quantity or size, and 
wealth is a multitude of tools for the arts of ruling household and city.” On the relation 
between Aristotle’s theory of the “natural limit” and his ethical views see Finley (1970). 
13 On the sociology of food, the “food system,” and “the world ‘behind’ our food” see Caro-
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production, storage and preparation, which were the focus of the 
traditional household economy, are not essentially connected with 
consumption, which has become an abstract function without ethical 
constraints. Consumption and convenience, which formerly signified 
“fittedness” to the natural order, come to signify the kind of ethically 
neutral ease of use and access which makes skill disappear altogether 
(Stopford 2011, 30).  
Marx writes in his remarks on Xenophon (1843-45) that useful is 
“everything which one knows how to use” (Marx 1971, 391).14 Usefulness 
is not a natural or “real” property of things, but a relational property that 
holds of persons and things. A complete analysis of the commodity in 
terms of use and exchange values would have to take into account the 
skills and abilities involved in both types of value. Smith had originally 
discussed exchange value in the context of his theory of growth, tracing it 
back to a human “propensity to truck, barter, and exchange” (Smith 1909, 
19). His account inaugurates what Graeber calls the “founding myth of 
economics” according to which money is introduced to replace barter. A 
successful barter system presupposes a “double coincidence of wants” 
between parties.15 This occurs rarely enough to make the use of money, 
which does not depend on such coincidences, an improvement. The 
“founding myth” thus provides a plausible explanation of how money and 
subsequently credit arise out of an original human propensity to barter 
and exchange (Graeber 2011, 22-24). 
Graeber questions the historical accuracy of this account, since the 
balance of anthropological evidence suggests that barter-based 
economies of this kind have never existed. Our familiarity with the 
distinction between exchange value and use value makes it easy to forget 
that to say something has a “use value” is also to say that someone 
knows how to use it. Here it is ‘knowing how to use’ that is primary and 
‘use value’ that is secondary. Just as Smith’s idea of a “propensity to 
truck, barter, and exchange” may be more retrospective reconstruction 
than anthropological fact, so also our ideas about use value. To 
                                                                                                       
lan 2013, especially Introduction and Chapter 3. 
14 The translation of Marx is from Booth 1993, 250. 
15 A “double coincidence of wants” exists if and only if each party happens to be able to 
offer in exchange exactly what the other party wants to acquire. 
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understand the meaning of “use” we need to know more about the 
structure of the skillful activities on which it is based.16  
Even Marx, who may have accepted some version of the founding 
myth of barter, does not offer his followers an account of the 
relationship between use and skill.17 The managers of “real existing 
socialism” followed Western capitalism in regarding a certain 
fragmentation of the labour process as inevitable (Murphy 1993, 10). 
The marginalization of skillful activity thus gains momentum with 
industrialization. Deskilling and the disaggregation of skills became 
pervasive, leading to a loss of synergies between different kinds of 
skillful activity (Stopford 2011, 31). Economic policy divorces labour 
from its foundations in skill when it “fetishizes” macro-economic labour 
productivity as a criterion of economic success (Jackson, 131-132).18  
This encourages the ongoing replacement of human labour by 
machinery and “labour saving devices.” Even in societies that guarantee 
a reasonable social minimum, such arrangements deprive people of a 
key opportunity for the development and exercise of important skills 
(Stopford 2009, 120-123).19 The alternative to fetishizing labour 
productivity may not be inefficiency, however, but the discovery of 
alternative configurations of skill and particular technologies that allow 
people to engage in meaningful forms of work (Jackson 2009, 132; 
Stopford 2009, 129-132).20 As Jackson notes, this does not mean that 
policies to enhance labour productivity must be abandoned under all 
circumstances. But focusing on macroeconomic labour productivity 
without reevaluating the traditional functions of investment is “a recipe 
for undermining work, community and environment” (Jackson 2009, 
132, 138).  
Economic institutions are a cultural force and culture is an economic 
force. If the fetishization of labour productivity undermines the 
                                                 
16 See Stopford 2009, 115-123, 148-60. 
17 On Marx’s view of barter in precapitalist economies see Booth 1993, 189-91. 
18 For further discussion of a “low growth” approach to labour productivity see Jackson 
2011, 101.  
19 On the “skillful self” see Stopford  2009, 45.  
20 On factors affecting the unity of conception and execution, including aptitudes, technol-
ogy, worker expectations, and government policy see Murphy, 227-228. 
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development of skill it also detracts from the cultural conditions of 
autonomy. The “social logic that locks people into materialistic 
consumerism as the basis for participating in the life of society” (180) 
also affects their abilities to grasp and use the tools that their culture 
offers. Wealth is not an end in itself, but a means that we must know 
how to use. It is for this reason that “the art of using” (Booth 1993, 48) 
forms the core of Aristotle’s theory of the household: “knowing how to 
use suggests the art of acquiring and employing with a view to the right 
end” (49). Since true wealth is acquired and used skillfully for a purpose 
it also has a natural limit which derives from that purpose. To acquire 
more than the natural limit prescribes is pointless. The art of using 
wealth thus leads naturally to the idea of a limit to the acquisition of 
wealth and of economic growth. 
Smith’s model of economic growth, centered on the rational self-
interested economic agent, the division of labour, specialization, 
technological development and the extension of markets, is viewed by 
many economists as unsustainable. Smith himself acknowledges that 
economic growth will eventually end in a “stationary state”.21 Both Mill 
(1902, 334-340) and Keynes (1972, 326) believe that a society without 
economic growth is inevitable “in the long run.” Neither author views 
this prospect pessimistically. Such a society need not be dismal and may 
even hold out the prospect of social, cultural, and moral progress.  
Jackson argues, however, that industrial nations face a “dilemma of 
growth” that cannot be left to take care of itself in the long run. On the 
one hand economic expansion at present rates is unsustainable and 
modern industrial economies must learn to live with diminishing 
economic growth (Jackson 2009, 14-15). On the other hand, “de-growth” 
is socially and political unstable. Societies that cannot maintain 
economic growth face the evils of social instability associated “with 
declining consumer demand […] rising unemployment, falling 
competitiveness and a spiral of recession” (65). 
Jackson suggests that the systematic bias towards macro-economic 
labour productivity in mature economies can be addressed by 
encouraging structural shifts in economic organization towards a 
                                                 
21 Smith 1909, 99-100.   
Reason, Morality, and Skill 
 
249 
“Cinderella economy” that is less material intensive and more labour 
intensive than economies that strive for a high labour productivity (130-
132, 154, 194-197). Such shifts to a low- or post-growth economy can be 
politically stable and ecologically sustainable if they are wedded to a 
conception of human prosperity that acknowledges limits. The 
conception of prosperity that Jackson proposes is based on a set of 
central capabilities like that proposed by Martha Nussbaum, with the 
significant limitation that the goal of securing the central capabilities for 
each citizen must be compatible with economic and ecological criteria of 
sustainability (45-47).  
Jackson follows Sen in rejecting theories that interpret the “living 
standard” in terms of commodity command (opulence), utility, and 
blunt proxies such as gross domestic product: “Commodity command is 
a means to the end of well-being, but can scarcely be the end itself [. . .]” 
(Sen 1985, 19).22 Sen argues that well-being is a matter of how well 
someone is able to function rather than of what commodities they 
command. Human functioning with a given commodity bundle 
depends on a person’s ability to convert commodities into functioning, 
and this in turn may depend on a variety of physiological, social, 
biographical, geographical and cultural factors (70-71). Seemingly 
egalitarian distributions of resources may be unjust because they fail to 
capture the injustices that arise out of such conversion inequalities. 
Nutritional policy, for example, should focus not on income or food as a 
commodity, but on the individual’s ability to be well-nourished.  
While Sen goes on to develop this line of argument in a way that 
emphasizes freedom, interpreted as capability to function rather than 
actual functioning, Nussbaum specifies a concrete list of central human 
capabilities owed to each citizen of a constitutional democracy. This list 
emphasizes both the broad range of human capabilities and the material 
                                                 
22 The limitations of GDP as a measure of prosperity seem obvious when it is pointed out 
that a large prison population will increase it, whereas efficient and effective healthcare 
will tend to reduce it. The existence of economically unnecessary malnutrition in Western 
populations is an example of the way in which the affluence of a society tends to under-
mine assumptions on which welfarism is based. For discussion of the logic of abundance, 
the diminishing marginal utility of extra commodities, and the “life satisfaction paradox” 
see Jackson, Chapter 3, 40-41. 
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conditions for their development through legislation and social policy 
(Nussbaum 2000, 78-70; Stopford 2009, 133-134). One reason for 
drawing up such a detailed list may be practical: political theories should 
be concrete enough to make it possible to operationalize the idea of 
development. They must specify important functions in a way that 
facilitates practical applications (Jackson 2009, 44).  
Nussbaum’s list of capabilities belongs to a “political” conception of 
the person that excludes metaphysical pleading and seeks to achieve 
(taking Rawls’s political liberalism as its model) an “overlapping 
consensus” through cross-cultural dialogue and democratic consultation 
(Nussbaum 2000, 74-75).23 The central capabilities embody what she 
calls “a partial ideal” of truly human functioning, inspired by Aristotle 
and Marx, and by the idea that governments should not seek to shape 
citizens but rather put them in a position to shape their own lives (72).24 
An important aim, which Nussbaum shares with Sen, is to overcome 
structural sources of disempowerment such as adaptive preference to 
which welfarist and resourcist views are insensitive (114-115, 136-141).25  
The proposal to focus government and constitutional policy around a 
normative view of political personhood exposes Nussbaum’s view to the 
charges of perfectionism and paternalism (Stopford 2009, 133, 135-
137).26 In addition, her prima facie prioritization of individual 
functioning raises problems of distributive justice that she cannot easily 
address (136, 146-148). In a move that Pogge characterizes as “inverted 
Aristotelianism” Nussbaum claims extra social resources not for the 
                                                 
23 On the idea of an “overlapping consensus” see Rawls 1996, 133-172. 
24 Nussbaum’s list (78-80) embraces a broad range of physical, intellectual, practical, emo-
tional and imaginative capabilities that are central to our relationship to ourselves, to oth-
ers, to animals, and to the natural world. 
25 For further discussions of resourcism and welfarism, and the sense in which Rawls is a 
resourcist, see Pogge 2002, 176 f. and Stopford 2009, 21-2, 140-142. 
26 Nussbaum responds to such criticisms by arguing that the list of central capabilities 
specifies a “partial” rather than a full conception of the good for persons, and that func-
tioning need be supported only up to a threshold below which truly human functioning is 
not available (2000, 75, 211-212).  But the level of functioning is not at what is at stake. It is 
the legitimacy of the use of state resources to impose or enable human functioning at any 
level that is in question. In The Skillful Self I take the view that the role of the central capa-
bilities in questions of distributive justice can only be heuristic (Stopford 2009, 141-142).  
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better but for the worse endowed, since the worse endowed will be 
entitled to an increased share of resources as part of the adjustment for 
conversion inequality. The limits of this redistributive project are 
unclear, since neither Nussbaum nor Sen proposes a metric for 
balancing claims across the entire social scheme. This in turn raises 
questions of feasibility and social stability (Pogge 2002, 206-209; 
Stopford 2009, 137-138). Such concerns are likely to be aggravated if the 
ecological and economic constraints of a low growth economy have to be 
taken into account.  
As we have seen, Aristotle’s theory of the household implies that the 
acquisition of wealth is circumscribed by a natural limit. Household 
wealth is not an end in itself but a means to a certain kind of life that is 
self-sufficient.27 It provides a model for flourishing within limits that 
distinguishes between life and the “good life,” treating the acquisition of 
household wealth as a means to the latter. Aristotle believes that people 
grow “acquisitive” when they lose sight of their original reasons for ac-
quiring wealth and, having failed to discover the good life, allow the pur-
suit of wealth to become their ruling activity.  
The resourcist’s view of the basis of social expectations echoes the 
view of wealth as an instrument. “Primary goods,” as Rawls calls them, 
are goods (obviously different in kind and scope from Aristotle’s concep-
tion of household wealth) that people know how to make use of in pur-
suing their conceptions of the good (Rawls 1971, 90-95). The capability 
approach, however, goes a step further than Aristotle or Rawls – perhaps 
a step too far – if it makes functioning the basis of social expectations 
(Stopford 2009, 138). This “step too far” diverts attention from a third 
factor relevant to the way human beings function, alongside resources 
and capabilities, namely the nonrepresentable skills (177-179).  
Skills are “representable” if they can be delegated to a third party 
without loss of function (for example when we pay a doctor to look after 
our health). There are, however, other cases in which skillful activity 
cannot be delegated without a loss of function (177). Capabilities can on-
                                                 
27 The word ‘wealth’ here denotes the generic objects of a household economy in the sense 
of Aristotle, not money, riches, or “net worth” in the modern sense.  On the translation 
and interpretation of αὐτάρκης see Meikle 1995, 44-45. 
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ly be said to be “truly human” if they are grounded in skills that are non-
representable in this sense: that each person must acquire and cultivate 
them for themselves.28 It is by conceiving and executing a plan of our 
own making that we take the first and most important step towards act-
ing in a truly human way.  
Because it is skillful, this first step is also already a step towards the 
capacity for rationality that is prefigured in what Kant calls the human 
“technical predisposition” (Kant 1978, 240; Sennett, 150).29 Both Kant 
and Aristotle, from their different perspectives, recognize that the 
human mind is formally flexible with regard to its objects. In the words 
of Aristotle: η ψυχη τα òντα πως ὲστιν (Aristotle 1907 III, 8, 431b20) - 
“Man’s soul is, in a certain way, entities.”30 While for Aristotle this is an 
ontological fact, for Kant it is a state of affairs that can only be conceived 
in conjunction with the historical process by which humankind emerges 
from its roots in the animal world and develops the technical 
predisposition for realizing freely chosen ends (Allison 2012, 239, 250; 
Louden 2011, xxv-xxvi). Culture is not the site of a battle between 
bestializing and humanizing tendencies (Sloterdijk 2009, 15) but a 
gradual process by which a capacity for reason that is already prefigured 
in the manipulative abilities of the human hand unfolds.31 Skill itself is 
                                                 
28 On the semantics of ‘capability’ and ‘skill’ see Stopford 2009, 146. 
29 The technical predisposition of mankind is illustrated by the capacity of the human hand 
to manipulate any object whatsoever. The hand is not confined to holding a particular kind 
of object or grasping a particular type of tool. Its freedom consists in the predisposition by 
which it can adapt to any object whatsoever. In this respect the human hand anticipates 
the flexibility of reason itself. Thus Kant writes in the Anthropology that “the characteriza-
tion of man as a rational animal is found in the form and organization of the human hand, 
its fingers, and fingertips. Nature has made them partly through their construction, and 
partly through their sensitivity, not only for manipulating objects in one particular way, but 
also in an open-ended way. Nature has made them, therefore, fit to be used by reason, and 
thereby Nature has indicated the technological gift, or the gift for skill, of this species as 
that of a rational animal” (Kant 1978, 240). 
30 Quoted with this English translation in Heidegger 1962, 34. 
31 See Sloterdijk 2009, 15-16. Sloterdijk argues that the humanistic “taming of man” has 
failed. But the humanism he describes - one that involves initiation into an “intimate soci-
ety of letters” as the key to the “calming of the inner beast” - is perfectionist. Sloterdijk 
does not consider the possibility of a – to paraphrase Rawls – “political not metaphysical” 
conception of education which, rather than dramatizing the contest of culture and barba-
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not moral, and the cultural, industrial, and scientific achievements that 
it makes possible may embody both progressive and regressive 
elements.32 But a society that undermines the very feature of culture that 
prefigures the human predisposition to reason can never be moral. 
Understanding the relationship between resources, capabilities and 
the nonrepresentable skills can throw light on the transition from a 
growth driven economy focused on consumption to a low growth 
economy which focuses on capability development “within limits.” Such a 
transition calls for a conception of prosperity that is consistent with 
sustainable levels of economic activity and thus presupposes an 
acceptance and understanding of limits. While the list of capabilities 
proposed by Nussbaum might provide a starting point for such a 
conception, Jackson argues that the capability approach must be 
“bounded” – that is to say that only ecological and economic resources 
consistent with a low or no economic growth scenario should be devoted 
to the development of the core capabilities (Jackson 2000, 45). But what 
would it mean to promote human capabilities under such circumstances? 
How can we make sense of the transition to a society that is no longer 
wedded to economic growth and is nevertheless prosperous? 
One clue to such a transition may be sought in the craft worker’s 
approach to resistances and limits. What Sennett calls the “material 
consciousness” of the craftsman involves a kind of “dialogue” through 
which the skilled worker voluntarily submits to the constraints of their 
material (Sennett 2008, 168). Learning and applying a craft involves 
learning to deal with limits. Progress in skillful activity involves dealing 
with obstacles and material resistances that the craftsman must address 
and devise strategies to overcome. “Skill builds by moving irregularly, 
and sometimes by taking detours” (238). Sometimes the least obvious 
course or strategy is the right one, and sometimes the craft worker 
confronts obstacles that they have themselves introduced. (220-222). 
Dealing with resistances requires the craftsman to develop secondary 
skills such as patience and self-discipline (Stopford 2009, 176). 
                                                                                                       
rism, focuses on the cultivation of the raw materials of human nature, recognizing that the 
growth of culture is slow and its progress uneven.  
32 See, for example, Kant’s account of the “shining misery” to which the culture of skill 
leads (Kant 1987, §83). 
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Skills acquired in this way are nonrepresentable because each person 
must acquire and exercise them for themselves and one person cannot 
exercise them on behalf of another. “Thinking as making” and the 
“material consciousness” of the craft worker involve the development of 
nonrepresentable skills in a specific medium.33 To learn to overcome 
such obstacles through these and other strategies may involve a slow and 
continuous process of development over many years. “Thinking as 
making,” as Aristotle would agree, is not the same as “thinking as 
doing.” To succeed the craft worker must learn to flourish within the 
limits of the available.  
The craft worker’s encounter with obstacles and resistances has par-
allels in other kinds of skillful activity that do not yield products and arti-
facts but are nevertheless skillful (175-84). Health, bodily integrity, the 
capacity for affiliation, and many other capabilities depend on forms of 
skillful activity that are liable to run into obstacles and resistances in 
much the way craft work does (148-60). Skills do not exist in isolation 
from one other but form networks. Skills acquired in one area of a net-
work may be transferred and adopted in others. Each type of skillful ac-
tivity may break down, whether occasionally or systematically. When a 
skill breaks down, the entire network of mutually supporting skills con-
nected with it is likely to be affected. We can think of each human being 
as the custodian of such a network of nonrepresentable skills that is 
theirs and theirs alone (177).  
What we discern here are the outlines of a culture of skill in which 
the craftsman’s slow, sometimes awkward, unpredictable and 
painstaking encounters with obstacles, resistances, and limits provide a 
pattern for human flourishing within limits. Cultural progress is neither 
fast nor instinctive. Were it so, we would not enjoy the flexibility that 
allows us to interact with the world in an “open-ended” way. Instead, 
human culture depends on a slow process of “trial, practice and 
                                                 
33 Sennett’s account of “material consciousness” might be seen as an elaboration of 
Heidegger’s (1927, §15) account of Zuhandensein , though Sennett’s method is not phe-
nomenological. Sennett uses the term “material consciousness” to signify not a “thematic” 
consciousness of an object, but rather a “productive awareness” that is disclosed by dealing 
with a material and expressed through phrases such as “thinking with one’s hands” (Sen-
nett 2008, 149-155). 
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instruction” (Kant 1991, 42). The skillful self does not respond to a 
problem by giving up, but by trying a different approach or looking at a 
difficulty in a different light. Rather than abandoning its goals, it seeks 
new ways and means to achieve them. “Skillpower is not willpower, and 
in craft as in art it often takes a long time to get from A to B.”34  
In a culture of skill people are concerned not with what they have but 
with what they have to do or what needs to be done. Such a culture is less 
susceptible than consumer culture to positional or “status goods” and 
unproductive status competition (Jackson 2009, 154-156) that adds “little or 
nothing to the levels of well-being” (53) and acts as a “material ‘ratchet’ that 
drives resources through the economy” (181).35 When the skillful self is 
engaged with the task at hand it may not even notice other selves, far less 
compare itself with them. To understand others as skillful selves is itself a 
form of skillful activity (Stopford 2009, 155). The others are encountered not 
as isolated individuals but in the context of activities in which we notice 
them because they too are engaged in doing something skillfully. 
The other is not someone who occupies the median position in a 
distribution or a consumer whose choices are mapped using demand 
curves, but a person who, like ourselves, has a task to do and does it 
more or less well. Rather than seeing others as economic agents whose 
material status we compare with our own, we see them in terms of what 
they can do and be. When citizens develop a skillful understanding of 
their own activities and have understood that others are also skillful 
selves who, like themselves, have their problems and obstacles to deal 
with, they are less likely to base their choices about how to live on the 
symbolic status of material commodities to which they lack a skillful 
relationship. Status syndrome and status anxiety are signs that the 
skillful self has lost touch with the essential context of everyday skillful 
activity.36 The less dependent we are on status goods and unproductive 
status competition the more our participation in society can focus on 
needs that are “truly human.” 
                                                 
34 Stopford 2011, 37 (author’s translation). The German text reads: „Die Kraft der 
Fähigkeiten ist keine Willenskraft, und im Handwerk wie in der Kunst braucht es oft eine 
lange Zeit, um von A nach B zu kommen.“ 
35 On consumer culture and the “iron cage” of consumerism see Jackson 2009, 87-102. 
36 On the essential role of contexts of purposes in use see Stopford 2009, 116-117.  
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A culture of skill thus furnishes a framework of less “materialistic” 
ways for people to participate in the life of society, reducing our 
dependency on material growth and preparing the way for a 
readjustment of the balance between investment, labour productivity 
and consumption (Jackson, 133-136). The restoration of a public culture 
of skill cannot by itself resolve questions of distributive justice and basic 
entitlements. Such issues remain on the day to day political agenda. But 
such a culture is necessary to sustain the kind of framework within 
which fairness is possible, holding bargaining and agreement about 
distributive shares and entitlements to within a manageable range, and 
laying the foundation for the reasonable management of social 
expectations.  
Political communities that wish to encourage the development of a 
culture of skill must thus seek ways to resist the marginalization of skill 
that has become a systematic feature of modern civilization. This does 
not require us to oppose the “chief dimensions of globalization,” but it 
does involve the search for configurations of economic and technological 
development that are consistent with a culture of skill and grounded in a 
democratic critique of technological rationality (Stopford 2009, 7-8, 123-
132). 37 This may, in turn, lead to a political conception of prosperity that 
reflects a skillful understanding of what it means to flourish within 
limits, and from this position begin to address the dilemma of growth 
with which ecologically challenged societies are faced. 
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